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In this paper  we compare  -  in the laboratory  -  stoppage and virtual 
strike.  Our  experiment  confirms  that  higher  wages  offered  by  an 
employer  lead  to  considerably  more  costly  effort  provision.  The 
number of  strikes, the level  of efforts and average total  payoffs are 
higher under virtual strike than under standard strike. However, when 
standard  strike  is  associated  with  reciprocal  externalities,  it  induces 
higher effort levels, higher payoffs and an extremely reduced number 
of strikes than virtual strike. It is unclear whether this behavior reﬂects 
reciprocity or other forms of social preferences. However our results 
might  explain  why  standard  strikes  rather  than  virtual  ones  are 
generally adopted by workers. 
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In this paper we compare - in the laboratory - stoppage and virtual strike. A virtual or 
nonstoppage strike has been defined (Ayres and Nalebuff, 2006) as the case where the 
workers keep working as usual and the ﬁrm keeps producing as usual, but neither side 
gets paid. Workers lose their wages and and employer loses its proﬁts during a strike. 
So during a virtual strike the workers would work for nothing and the employer would 
give up its revenues.  
Bernstein (1961) first attempted to formulate the rule governing virtual strike in public 
services: employee union would be free to declare a nonstoppage strike after all other 
bargaining procedures failed to produce a settlement. Employees would be obliged to 
continue to work full time but would forego a portion of their take-home pay. This 
money would be paid by the employer directly into a special fund and in addition to 
paying the equivalent of regular wages, the employer would also put into the fund an 
extra amount equal to what the employees have given up. 
The economic rationale for virtual strike relies on the idea of producing for bargaining 
parties the same result as standard stoppage strike, without generating social costs to 
third parties. Thus, from an aggregate welfare perspective, it seems that virtual strike 
always dominates standard strike. However, virtual strikes are the exception rather than 
the rule governing employer-employees bargaining.  
As Nicita and Rizzolli (2009) argue, one of the reason for the extremely infrequent case 
of virtual strike could be that, especially in public services, workers are often induced to 
recur to hard stoppage strike that raise social costs precisely to exert higher pressure on 
employers‟ side. Thus the case for virtual strike seem to raise in one of the following 
cases: (i) when private costs imposed on the other bargaining party are high enough to 
assure compliance and/or striking parties care about third parties social costs; (ii) when 
at least a portion of social costs raised by stoppage strike falls back on striking parties. 
In order to understand workers‟ choice between virtual strike and standard or stoppage 
strike  we  investigate  parties‟  incentives  to  cooperate  in  the  presence  of  negative 
externalities on (and by) third parties. 
This article describes the results of an experiment designed to test whether the choice 
between standard or virtual strike is affected by the emergence of third party externality 
and/or by the dimension of private costs of striking activity. Following Charness (2004) 
and Fehr et al. (2007) we formalize employer-employees bargaining activity as a game 3 
 
of alternative offers over the wage-effort pairs. Workers reply with  a given level of 
effort to a wage proposal by employer. Bargaining process ends when an agreement is 
reached. We have then described „strike activity‟ as the worker‟s refusal of a previous 
wage offfered by employer. In particular we have modelled „stoppage strike‟ as the case 
in which refusal to accept a wage proposal implies stopping production, with workers 
gaining  the  opportunity  cost  of  effort  and  employer  gaining  the  cost  of  wages,  but 
loosing potential earnings. 
Our first treatment regarded this kind of standard strike. Our second treatment regarded 
standard strike with externality. We have assumed that strike would impose a net loss 
on third parties and on bargaining parties. The last treatment considered the case for a 
weaker version of virtual strike, imposing the cost of strike only on workers. We have 
assumed that a bargaining failure, i.e. a refusal by workers to accept a proposed wage, is 
not associated to stopping production, which continues under new bargaining stage. 
Under this setting, workers face the cost of effort while wages are paid to third parties. 
Our experiment confirms that higher wages offered by an employer lead to considerably 
more costly effort provision. The number of strikes, the level of efforts and average total 
payoffs are higher under virtual strike than in standard strike.  
However, when standard strike is  associated with reciprocal  externalities, it induces 
higher effort levels, higher payoffs and an extremely reduced number of strikes than 
virtual strike. It is unclear whether this behavior reﬂects reciprocity or other forms of 
social preferences.  
Our  result  suggests  that  the  dimension  of  externalities  under  standard  strike  might 
enhane incentives for stoppage strike rather than for virtual ones. This might explain 




2. Experimental Design 
 
Participants were undergraduate students recruited from classes and by posting notices 
at the University of Siena in the period November 2007 – May 2008. A total of 188 
subjects participated in the experiment; 70 had the role of “employer”; 70 had the role 
of  “worker”  and  the  other  48  had  the  “third  party”  designation.  Average  earnings, 
including a  € 2  show-up fee, were  € 13.4 for  about  50 minutes of time.  In  all the 4 
 
treatments pairing among subjects were anonymous, the payoff functions were common 
information, and participants were required to calculate both employer and employee 
payoffs  in  three  preliminary  exercises  with  hypothetical  wage-effort  pairs.  These 
exercises were reviewed before proceeding with the experiment, insuring that subjects 
understood the payoff mechanism. 
 
Summary of the experimental design 
Session  Treatment  Participants  Total participants by 
treatment 
1  Virtual strike    18   
2  Virtual strike    24   
3  Virtual strike    24   
4  Virtual strike    18   
5  Virtual strike    18  102 
6  Standard strike     14   
7  Standard strike    14   
8  Standard strike    16  44 
9  Standard strike with externality    21   
10  Standard strike with externality    21  42 
Total    188  188 
 
   
A.  Standard strike  
 
The first treatment concerned standard strike. We have defined it as a worker‟s rejection 
of an offer by employer in a bargaining process. Thus a refusal by worker to agree on a 
proposed wage, implies no effort and zero production. The bargaining process in the 
case of standard strike: 
Phase 1: Employer offers a wage 
Phase 2: Worker proposes effort 
Phase 3: Employer confirms or changes wage 
Phase 4: Worker accepts (agreement) or reject (strike) wage/effort pair. 
Also  in  this  case  we  had  10  repetitions  and  in  each  repetition  the  same  matching 
between the employer and the worker. Initial endowments were 150 guilders for the 
employer and 50 guilders for the worker. Experimental “guilders” were converted to 
dollars at the rate of 20 to € 1. The schedule of cost as a function of effort is shown 
below:  
Effort  0,1  0,2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0 
Cost  0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  18 5 
 
   
Payoffs functions were assumed as following: 
1. Agreement (no strike):  
    Employer‟s payoff     E=(120 - w)e 
    Worker‟s payoff     W=(w– e – 20) 
2. Strike 
    Employer‟s payoff    E=0  
    Worker‟s payoff    W= 0 
 
     
B. Standard strike with externality 
 
In this treatment we have assumed that, in the event of a strike, a reciprocal externality 
occurs: worker‟s strike negatively affects third party and, in turn, third party negatively 
affects worker‟s payoff. This assumption could be referred to two cases: (a) third party 
reaction generates a negative externality for worker (we can label this as „reciprocal 
externality‟); (b) worker‟s payoff function negatively depends on third party‟s payoff 
(to simplicity‟s sake we can label this as „fairness‟). The experiment does not allow to 
distinguish between the two above cases. The bargaining process is the same as in the 
case of standard strike: 
Phase 1: Employer offers a wage 
Phase 2: Worker proposes effort 
Phase 3: Employer confirms or changes wage 
Phase 4: Worker accepts (agreement) or reject (virtual strike) wage/effort pair 
 
Also  in  this  case  we  have  run  10  repetitions,  each  with  the  same  matching 
between the employer and the worker, and it is assume that the same third party is 
involved in each matching. Initial endowments for standard strike with externality are 
given by 300 guilders for the employer, 200 guilders for the worker and 150 guilders for 
third party.  In this treatment, experimental “guilders” were converted to dollars at the 
rate of 80 to € 1. The schedule of cost as a function of effort is shown below: 
 
Effort  0,1  0,2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0 
Cost  0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  18 6 
 
   
Payoffs functions were assumed as following: 
1. Agreement:  
    Employer‟s payoff    E= (120 - wage)x(effort) 
    Worker‟s payoff    W= (wage – effort cost – 20) 
    Third party‟s payoff     T= 0 
2.  Strike with externality 
    Employer‟s payoff    E=- 15  
    Worker‟s payoff    W=- 15 




C. Virtual Strike  
 
The last treatment concerned virtual strike. We have defined it in a weaker version, as a 
bargaining process in which a refusal by worker to agree on a proposed wage, implies 
continuing providing effort and production, whereas wage is transferred to third party. 
This is the case of the so-called „hold-out‟ bargaining, where a previous contract has 
elapsed and a new one needs to be settled. The bargaing process is then described as 
follows: 
Phase 1: Employer offers a wage 
Phase 2:  Worker proposes effort 
Phase 3:  Employer confirms or changes wage 
Phase 4: Worker accepts (agreement) or reject (virtual strike) wage/effort pair 
 
The treatment has involved 10 repetitions and in each repetition there was the same 
matching between employer and worker, and it was assumed that the same third party 
would benefit in the case of a strike. Initial endowments were the following: employer 
(150  guilders);  worker  (50  guilders);  third  party  (zero  guilders).  Experimental 
“guilders” were converted to dollars at the rate of 20 to € 1. The schedule of cost as a 
function of effort is shown below
1:  
                                                           
1 As in Charness (2004) we have assumed that the return to the employer is much greater than the cost to 
the worker for the effort levels usually recorded; the ratio of employer beneﬁt to employee cost depends 7 
 
 
Effort  0,1  0,2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0 
Cost  0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  18 
 
   
Payoffs functions have been set as following: 
1.  Agreement (no strike):  
    Employer‟s payoff      E=(120 - w)e 
    Worker‟s payoff      W=(w – e – 20) 
    Third party‟s payoff        T=0 
2. Virtual strike 
    Employer‟s payoff      E=- w  
    Worker‟s payoff      W= - e 





Average effort increased in all treatments. The increase of effort over time was higher in the 
virtual treatment (+ 30.0%) than in the standard (+20.0%) and in the externality treatments 
(+10.3%). Average effort was  higher in  the externality treatment  than in  the other two 
treatments (total average values 0.63 ext – 0.50 virtual – 0.47 standard). The difference 
between  average  wages  between  the  virtual  strike  treatment  and  standard  strike  with 
externality decreased until the ninth period. In the tenth period there was a pronounced 
deadline effect for the virtual strike treatment, in which average effort decreased (- 10%). 
The highest effort was recorded in the 9
th period in the virtual strike treatment (0.57), in the 
4
th period in the externality treatment (0.52) and in the 7







                                                                                                                                                                          
on the wage chosen. 8 
 
Tab. 2  Wage offered by employers vs. workers’ effort by period 
  Virtual strike  Standard strike 
Standard Strike 
with externality 
Period  Effort  Wage  Effort  Wage  Effort  Wage 
1  0,40  43,9  0,40  45,3  0,58  59,7 
2  0,42  44,4  0,43  48,6  0,64  63,9 
3  0,46  45,8  0,44  46,7  0,64  60,4 
4  0,50  47,0  0,45  50,6  0,67  61,2 
5  0,52  46,9  0,47  50,7  0,66  65,0 
6  0,47  43,3  0,48  49,8  0,64  61,9 
7  0,55  51,0  0,52  50,2  0,65  62,8 
8  0,55  50,3  0,52  48,7  0,59  60,2 
9  0,57  51,1  0,50  44,5  0,63  59,5 
10  0,52  45,4  0,48  43,7  0,64  60,9 
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Average  offered  wage  increased  in  the  virtual  strike  treatment  (+3.5%)  and  in  the 
externality treatment (+0.2%) while it decreased in the no virtual treatment (-3.6%).  
However, there was a pronounced deadline effect in two of the three treatments, which 
caused the wage to decrease in the last period.  By taking into account the difference 
between the wage offered in period 1 and the highest offered wage in all the treatments 
the increase was higher for the virtual strike treatment (+16,4%) than in the other two 
treatments (no virtual +11.9%, externality +8.9%).  Average wage was higher in the 
externality treatment than in the other two treatments (total average values: 61.6 ext – 
47.9 no virtual – 46.9 virtual). The highest wage was recorded in the 9
th period in the 
virtual strike treatment (51.1), in the 5
th period for the standard treatment (50.7) and in 
the 5
th period for the externality treatment (62.8). Reputation effect matters more in the 
virtual strike treatment than in the other two treatments, as made evident by deadline 
effects and the occurrence of highest wages and effort in the next-to-last period. 
The distributions of chosen efforts and of offered wages are similar in the virtual strike 
and standard strike with externality treatments, while it is more asymmetrical in the 
standard  strike  treatment.  In  the  standard  strike  treatment  the  effort  level  with  the 
highest number of observations (mode) is 0.5, while in other two treatments is 1. In the 
standard treatment the mode is the intermediate wage brackets 30-50, while in the other 
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Tab. 3 Wage/Effort Pairs by Wage Bracket – Virtual strike  
  Effort     
Wage 
bracket 
0,1  0,2  0,3  0,4  0,5  0,6  0,7  0,8  0,9  1,0  Tot.  % 
0-19  16  2            1      19  5,6 
20-29  18  7  2                27  7,9 
30-39  5  10  6  2  2  1  1  1      28  8,2 
40-49  6  2  9  5  10  6  4  1      43  12,6 
50-59  1    3  11  12  10  1  1      39  11,5 
60-69    1    2  6  23  11  3    4  50  14,7 
70-79          1  5  13  17  39  46  121  35,6 
80-89  1      1  1      1  2  3  9  2,6 
90-  4                    4  1,2 
Total  51  22  20  21  32  45  30  25  41  53  340   
%  15,0  6,5  5,9  6,2  9,4  13,2  8,8  7,4  12,1  15,6     
 
Tab. 4 Wage/Effort Pairs by Wage Bracket – Standard strike  
  Effort     
Wage 
bracket 
0,1  0,2  0,3  0,4  0,5  0,6  0,7  0,8  0,9  1,0  Tot.  % 
0-19  2  4  1  1              8  3,6 
20-29  7  4  4  1    1          17  7,7 
30-39  4  9  8  4  13  9          47  21,4 
40-49  2  5  5  11  13  4  6  2      48  21,8 
50-59  3  5  7  3  5  3  4        30  13,6 
60-69  1    3  4  5  6  3        22  10,0 
70-79      3    7  6  3  2    19  40  18,2 
80-89    1      2  3  1      1  8  3,6 
90-                      0  0,0 
Total  19  28  31  24  45  32  17  4  0  20  220   







Tab. 5 Wage/Effort Pairs by Wage Bracket – Standard strike with externality  
  Effort     
Wage 
bracket 
0,1  0,2  0,3  0,4  0,5  0,6  0,7  0,8  0,9  1,0  Tot.  % 
0-19                      0  0,0 
20-29  5  2  1                8  5,7 
30-39  5  3  1  1              10  7,1 
40-49  1  4  3  4        1    1  14  10,0 
50-59  1  2  4  2  5  2  1  1      18  12,9 
60-69    1  7    1  3  6  4      22  15,7 
70-79    1  1    1    2  9  25  25  64  45,7 
80-89            1        3  4  2,9 
90-                      0  0,0 
Total  12  13  17  7  7  6  9  15  25  29  140   































Tab. 4  Strikes by period 



















1  4  11,8%  2  9,1%  1  7,1% 
2  3  8,8%  3  13,6%  1  7,1% 
3  5  14,7%  3  13,6%  1  7,1% 
4  3  8,8%  1  4,5%  3  21,4% 
5  8  23,5%  5  22,7%  1  7,1% 
6  4  11,8%  1  4,5%  0  0,0% 
7  1  2,9%  2  9,1%  2  14,3% 
8  7  20,6%  4  18,2%  1  7,1% 
9  3  8,8%  3  13,6%  2  14,3% 
10  5  14,7%  1  4,5%  2  14,3% 
Tot. of strikes  43  12,6%  25  11,4%  14  10,0% 
Tot. of subjects  102    44    42   
Tot. of pairs  34    22    14   
 
In the final period the relation between wage and effort in the final period is positive: 



























in the other two treatments. In the virtual strike treatment the pairs wage/effort exhibited 




The relative number of strikes was higher in the virtual strike treatment (12.6%) than in 
the  other  two  treatments  (standard  11.4%  -  standard  with  externality  10.0%).  The 
relative number of strikes in the virtual strike and in the standard strike treatment was 
highly correlated (corr. coeff. +0.618).The highest number of strikes was recorded in 
the 5
th period in the virtual strike treatment (8), in the 5
th period for the standard strike 
treatment (5) and in the 4
th period for the externality treatment (3). 
 
Average  payoffs  were  higher  in  the  externality  treatment  than  in  the  virtual  strike 
treatment. Average payoffs were higher in the virtual strike treatment than in the no 



































Tab. 5 Average payoffs by period 
 
Virtual strike  Standard strike 
Standard strike 
with externality 
Period  Employer  Worker  Third Party  Employer  Worker  Employer  Worker  Third Party 
1  19,1  26,1  3,2  18,4  23,2  27,6  28,9  -1,1 
2  25,7  26,3  2,0  22,2  22,1  28,7  31,2  -1,1 
3  24,8  27,8  2,9  20,1  18,6  30,6  29,5  -1,1 
4  26,2  25,4  4,5  25,6  24,8  24,2  24,0  -3,2 
5  19,8  23,8  8,7  19,2  21,4  28,1  31,3  -1,1 
6  25,7  23,2  3,6  23,3  26,5  32,3  32,3  0,0 
7  31,4  30,5  1,5  26,7  25,4  25,8  26,8  -2,1 
8  23,0  26,9  10,0  20,2  24,3  27,1  30,2  -1,1 
9  30,3  31,2  2,1  22,3  26,1  27,3  25,4  -2,1 
10  27,9  25,7  3,7  24,4  19,5  25,1  27,8  -2,1 





The linear regression over time of employers‟ payoffs was positive in the virtual strike 
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Tab. 6 Average Total Payoffs  
 
Virtual strike  No virtual strike 
Virtual strike  
with externality 
Employers  366,8  297,3  538,3 
Workers  289,4  237,3  487,4 
Third party  35,9    135,0 
 
 
Average total payoffs were higher in the externality treatment than in the virtual strike 
treatment. Average total payoffs were higher in the virtual strike treatment than in the 




4. Preliminary Conclusions 
 
As in the previous experiment adopting the same experimental framework (Charness 
2004, Charness et al, 2007, Fehr et al. 2007) results of all treatments indicate a positive 
relationship between effort and wage. Wages, effort and payoffs are higher in the virtual 
strike case than in the standard strike treatment without externality.  
The introduction of externalities in the case of standard strike decreases the number of 
strike, increases wage and effort and is associated to higher average and total payoffs. 
The increase over time of payoffs is more pronounced in the virtual strike case than in 
the other two treatments. This outcome can be attributed to the reputation effect. It is 
unclear whether this behavior reﬂects reciprocity or other forms of social preferences. 
This might explain why standard strikes rather than virtual ones are generally adopted 
by workers. 
As a consequence, as outlined by Nicita and Rizzolli (2009), from a policy perspective a 
regulation forcing parties towards virtual strike when relevant externalities are at stake 
would thus seem necessary. Such a regulation should somehow introduce side payments 
for the virtual strike and/or high penalties for the standard strike, in order to properly 
align workers‟ incentives.  16 
 
However, high penalties would be unenforceable in democratic systems where the right 
to strike is guaranteed by the constitution.  
Moreover, as outlined by our treatment on standard strike with externality, there are 
cases  in  which virtual strike  generates  a lower  level  of  aggregate  welfare than that 
obtainable through stoppage strike.  
Finally, one important result of our treatment in virtual strike is showing the existence 
of some „fairness‟ concern on bargainers' side towards third party. Thus, even when 
there are no negative externalities on workers‟ and employer‟s side, there is a fairness 
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